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In 1993, the United States Su

the Arizona Supreme Court has de

preme Court in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Phannaceuticals, Inc. 1 over

clined to follow Daubert, noting that

it was "not bound by the United

ruled the general acceptance stan

States Supreme Court's non-consti

dard set forth in Frye v. United
States, 2 a 1923 decision by the

tutional constmction of the Federal
Rules of Evidence when we construe

D.C. Circuit.In its place, the Court

the Arizona Rules ·of Evidence."5

substituted a reliability test for de
termining the admissibility of sci
entific

e v i d e nce.

The

The Court went

o� to remark: "Our

rules ...are court-enacted.While

Frye

the United States Supreme

standard had been the majority rule

Court

considers congressional purpose,

in both federal and state courts
until Daubert. This article dis

this court-\:vh·en const.nJing a rtlle
we have adopted-must rely on text

cusses the reactions of state courts
to the Daubert decision.

a..nd our own intent in adopting or
amending the rule in the first in

Daubert rests on an interpretation
of the Federal Rules of Evidence,3
a..nd therefore as a statutory, rather
than a constitutional, case, it is not
binding on the states. This is true
even in the forty jurisdictions that
have adopted evidence rules based
on the Federal Rules.4 For exarriple,

stance."6 Similarly, the Nebraska
Supreme Court has commented:
"[I\J]otwithstanding that our rule 702
parallels. the feder al r u le 702,

Daubert does not apply to state court
decisions.The increasing prevalence
of expert evidence cautions against
·the adrrjssion of scientific evidence
which is still the subject of dispute

*Albert J. Weatherhead In & Rich
ard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law,
Case Western Reserve University. This
column is based in part on P. Giannelli
& E.Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence
C ?d ed. 1993). Reprinted with permis
siOn.

and controversy in the relevant sci
entific communities ....We thus

adhere to the F;ye staildard.. . ."7

fP!rtreQ!IJaul/Jerfl Apprt«:»aJch!res

1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma
ceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 570 (1993).

An understanding of the post

Daubert developments requires

2 Frye v. UnitedStates, 293 F. 1013
(D.C.Cir. 1923).

5State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1183
(Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S .
1046 (1994).

3 509 U.S .at 587 ("We interpret the
legislatively-enacted Federal Rules of
Evidence as we would any statute. ").

6

4See Joseph &Saltzburg, The Fed
eral Rules of Evidence in the States iii

Id.

v. Dean, 523 N.W.2d 681,
692-93 (l'Teb. 1994).
7 State

(1992) (preface).
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some a p p r eciatiOn of the pre
Daub eri case hi.w. At the time

,

Daubert carne before the Supreme
Court, there were four approaches
to the admissibility

ofscientific evi

dence in this country. First, a ma

testing,8 battered women syndrome,9

and intoxication testing10 (including

·

the horizontal gaze n ystagmus

test).11 Frye has also been applied to

various aspects of D N A evidence:

RL F P, 12 P CR,1 3 binning,1 4 band-

jority of jurisdictions followed the

Frye general acceptance test,includ

ing most federal circuit courts. Sec
ond, a number of courts had rejected

Frye, adopting a relevancy test. Un,.

der this view, ifthe expert was quali
fied, the underlying technique used
by that expert was also qualified. In

9 State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 48-50
(Wash. 1994) (en bane) (battered per
son syndrome generally acc.epted but
only in a long-term relationship).

practice, this approach often left the
reliability issue to the jury.

In the 1980s, a third position be

10 Seewar v. Surn.rllerdale, 601 So. 2d
198, 200 .(Ala. Crim . App. 1992)
(Intoxilyzer 5000 generally accepted).

gan to develop, one that rejected

Frye but required a judicial deter

mination of reliability. This reliabil

11
E.g., People v. Lea.l:!y, 882 P.2d
321, 334 (Cal. 1994) ("[T]estimony by
police officers regarding the mere ad
ministration of the HGN test is insuffi
cient to meet the general acceptance
standard . . ."); State v. Witte, 836 P.2d
1110, 1121 (Kan. 1992) (HG� "evi
dence requires a Frye foundation for
admissibility."); State v. Klawitter, 518
N.W.2d 577, 585 (Minn. 1994) (HGN
satisfies Frye).

ity approach was more stringent than
the relevancy approach. Under this
approach, the trial court was re
quired to go beyond the expert's
quali fications and scrutinize the re
liability of the underlying scienti fic
technique. This approach was the
precursor

at the

Supreme Court's

·

decision in Daubert.

1 2 E.g., State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d
502, 512 (Wash. 1993) (General sci
entific theory underlying DNA iden
tifications and the RFLP test generally
accepted in the relevant scientific
communities).

Finally, an approach labelled

"Frye plus" surfaced in some D N A

cases. This approach is notan alter
native that replaces Frye, but rather

it adds a further element to the Frye

13 E .g., State v. Carter, 524 N.W.2d
763, 783 (Neb. 1994) (DNA-PCR DQ
alpha statistical probability calculations
not generally accepted); State v.
Russell, 882 P.2d 747,768 (Wash. 1994)
(PCR-DQ alpha generally accepted; the
Cetus kit is only one means of PCR test
ing and need not be shown to be gener
ally accepted), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1129 (1995).

test. Moreover, it is not necessarily

tied to the Frye rule. Indeed, some

recent decisions may be described
as "Daubert plus."
·

Frye

v.

8 Commonwealth v. Khamphouse
ane, 642 A.2d 490, 492 (Pa. Super.)
(Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) test
ing to establish paternity in a statutory
rape case generally accepted), appeal
denied, 649 A.2d 669 (Pa. 1994).

United States

Numerous state courts continue

to apply the Frye test post-Daubert.

14 E.g., People v. Venegas, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 856, 864--66 (Cal. App. 1995)
(prosecution failed to establish that FBI
"binning" method and statistical calcu
lations satisfy Frye; reliability of Cell-

Since 1993, Fryehas been applied

to a wide range. of scientific tech
niques in criminal cases, including
Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA)
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shifting, 15 statistical calculations, 16
and the ceiling principle.17
Many important jurisdictions
s t i l l adhere to the Frye r u l e:
Alaska, 18 California, 19 Colorado,20

Maryland,24

York/6

Nebraska,25

Nevv

and WashingtonY Some

Frye jurisdictions, however, have
not definitively rejected Daubert,

but have merely postponed consid

Florida,21 Illin o i s,22 Kansas,23

eration of the issue.28 In other cases,

intermediate appellate courts have

mark DNA method in prior case did not
automatically apply to FBI method).

felt bound to apply Frye until their

respective state supreme courts

15 Hayes v. State, 660 So. 2d 257,
262, 264 (Fla. 1995) ("Florida utilizes
the Frye test"; courts may take judiCial
notice on some aspects of DNA, but
conecting for band-shifting is not gen
erally accepted):
,
1 6 E.g., State v.Sivri, 646 A.2d 169,
189-92 (Conn. 1994) (while DNA evi
dence generallfaccepted, case remanded
to decide if population frequency calcu
lations are generally accepted); Lindsey
v. People, 892 P.2d 281(Colo. 1995)(en
bane) (DNA population statistics gener
ally accepted under Frye).

speak on the issue.29

23State v. Hill, 895 P.2d 1238, 1245
(Kan. 1995) ("Kansas has repeatedly
applied Frye.'').
24 UnitedStates c;:Jypsum Co. v. Bal
timore, 647 A.2d 405, 423 (Md. 1994)
(asbestos evidence).
25 State v. Carter, 524 N.W.2d 763,
783, 779(Neb. 1994) ("[W]e decline to
adopt the less demanding Daubert stan
dard and reaffirm Frye as the standard
for determining the admissibility of
DNA evidence.").

17 E.g:,State v. Buckner, 890 P.2d
460, 462 (Wash. 1995) (en bane) (sta
tistics based on ceiling principle gener
ally accepted but testimony that only
one Caucasian in 19.25 billion (four
times the present population of the
E arth) inadmissible); State v. Bloom,
516 N.W.2d. 159, 167 (Minn. 1994)
(random match probability based of in
terim ceiling met.hod ad!Ilissible).

26 People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451,
455-56 (N.Y. 1994) (Lifecodes DNA
method generally accepted; visual
matching accepted by scientific com
munity in 1988).

2 7State v. Riker, 869 P. 2d 43, 48 n.l
(Wash. 1994) (en bane) (Court will
"continue to adhere to the view that the
F1]'e analysis is a threshold inquiry to
be considered in determining the admis
sibility of evidence under E R 702 ";
however, "many of the 'general obser
vations' made [in Daubert] may be of
use to trial judges in making the thresh
old F1]'e determination.").

18

Harmon v. State, 908 P.2d 434,
440-41 (Alaska 1995)(DNA evidence,
both RFLP and PCR, satisfies the Frye
test; statistical a.nalysis accompanying
each form of DNA testing also gener
ally accepted).

19 E.g., People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d
321, 331 (Cal. 1994) (The "Kelly for
mulation [of Frye under Cal. Evid.
Code] survived Daubert ...").

28 Commonwealth v. Crews, 640
k2d 395,400 n.2(Pa. 1994) ("Daubert
relaxes, somewhat, the impediments to
admission of novel scientific evidence.
. . . ·whether or not the rationale of
Daubert will supersede or modify the
F1]'e test in Pennsylvania is left to an
other day.").

20 Lindsey v. People, 892 P.2d 281,

288 (Colo. 1995) (en bane) (applying

Frye; DNA statistics generally accepted

despite "subgroup" debate) (noting

Daubert "issue not now before us").

21
Flanagan v.State, 625So. 2d 827,
829 n.2 (Fla. 1993) (Despite Daube11,
"Florida continues to adhere to the Fiye
test.").

29State v. Cissne, 865 P.2d 564, 569
(Wash. App. 1994) ("[U]ntil such time
as our Supreme Court abandons F1]'e
and interprets ER 702 in the same man
ner as Daubert Fed. R. Evict. 702, we
are bound by . . . previous decision.").

22 People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721

(Til. 1996) ("Illinois follows the F1]'e

standard for the admission of novel sci
entific evidence.").
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In defending its decision to ad
here to Frye, the Washington Su
preme Court made the following
comment:

are supported by a qualified expert

witness should be received unless
there are other reasons for exclu
sion. Particularly, its probative
. value may be overborne by the fa
miliar dangers of prejudicing or
misleading the jury, unfair surprise
and undue consumption of timeY

The State maintains that this

court should abandon Frye and

adopt Daubert. The Stat� argues

that Frye is difficult to apply. While

The balancing of probative value

Frye may be difficult to apply in

against other factors such as mis

some contexts, this is a result of the
comp I extty
. ' of the partiCular sci-

l eadin g

·

the

jury,

of

which

ence at issue, the extent tci which

McCormick spoke, is comparable

made its view known, and the

p ractice, however, this approach

to present Federal Rule

. the scientific community has

trial judges do not possess the sci

entific community. The same, or

entific background todetermine rel

similar problems, arise under

testability, the extent to which the

-

evance/reliability, the judge "will
generally be forced to accept the

probative value of the evidence as

scientific technique or method is

what a qualified expert testifies it to

accepted by the scientific commu

be."32 In effect, qualifying the expert

nity,and drawing the line between

presumptively qualifies the tech

legitimate science and "junk" sci

nique. This is too lax a standard for

ence, along with other questions.

criminal cases. Moreover, "[t]he

Questions of admissibility of com

major flaw in the relevancy analy

plex, controversial scientific tech

sis ... is its failure to recognize the

niques o r methods, like those

distinctive problems of scientific

involving DNA evidence,are going

evidence, "33

to be difficult under either standard.30

Daubert implicitly rejects this

approach. The United States Su

Relevancy Approach

preme Court emphasized: "That the

In his 1954 evidence text, Profes
sor Charles McCormick criticized
the Frye test.In his view:

Frye test was displaced b y the Rules

:

of Evidence does not mean how

ever, that the Rules themselves place
no limits on the admissibility of sci-

"General scientific acceptance" is

a proper condition upon the court's

3 1 McCormick, Evidence 363-64
(1954) ..

taking judicial notice of scientific

facts, but not a criterion for the

3 2 _sn;o �· "Ques?ons Affecting the
�
Adnusstbthty of Scientific Evidence,"
1970 U. TIL L.F. 1, 22.

admissibility of scientific evidence.
Any relevant conclusions which

30

In

might be quite different. Since most

extent of any dispute in the sci

Daubert, including questions of

403.

33 Giannelli, "The Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, A Half-Century Later,"
80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1250 (1980).

State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1'304,

1314 (Wash. 1996) (en bane).
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Stated otherwise, expert testimony
is admissible in Wisconsin if rel
evant and will be excluded only if
the testimony is superfluous or a
waste of time.
Assuming that Daubert in its
application represents something
beyond Walstad, we observe that
. we . . . are bound to follow our su
preme court case law. 38

entific evidence. Nor is the trial

judge disabled from screening such
evidence.To the contrary, under the
Rules the trial judge fuust ensure that

any and all scientific testimony or
evidence· admitted is not only rel
evant, but reliabie;"34
R�spit� JLO:UQlJJJ, s_<?m�_fsmrts
still follow th1s approach.�For �x
ample, in State v. Peters35 the Wis
·
consin Court of Appeals, in
upholding the admissibility of DNA
evidence, stated that Wisconsin fol
lowed neither Frye nor Daubert: .
"Once the relevancy of the evi
dence is established and .the. wit

In sum, Daubert not only rejects

Frye but the relevancy test as well.

Reliability Approach
A number of jurisdictions have
explicitly rejected Frye in favor of
the Daubert approach-for ex
ample, Connecticut, 39 Indiana, 40
Kentucky, 41 Massachusetts, 2
4 New

ness is qualified. as an expert, the
reliability of the evidence is a
weight and credibility issue for the

fact finder and any reliability chal
lenges m u st b e made thro u g h
cross-examin a tion o r b y other
means of impeachment"36
In State v. Donner,31 an intoxiCa
tion case, the same court wrote:

38 Id. at 3 74 (quo ting State v.
Walstad, 351 N.W.2d 469, 487 (Wis.
1984)):
39 State v. Porter, 694 A.2d 1262
(Conn. 1997) (poly graph).

[B]efore Daubert, the Frye test was

not the law in Wisconsin. To that
ex t e n t , Wisconsin law a n d
Daubert coincide. Beyond that,
W isconsin law holds that "any
relevant conclusions which are
su pported by a qualified witness
should be received unless there
are other reasons for exclusion."

34

509 U.S. at 589.·

State v. P eters, 534 N.W.2d 867
(Wis. App. 1995) (DNA admissible
notwithstanding the absence of Native
Americans from the· database· used to
project the likelihood of a coincidental
DNA match), rev. denied, 537 N.W.2d
572 (Wis. 1995).
35

36

40 Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490,
.
. 498 (Irid. 1995} ("The concerns driv
. ing Daubert coincide with the express
requirement of Indiana Rule of Evidence 702(b) that the trial court be sat
isfied of the reliability of the scientific
principles involved. Thus, although not
binding upon the determination of state
evidentiary law issues, the federal evi
dence law of Daubert and its progeny
is helpful to the bench and bar in ap
plying Indiana Rule of Evidence
702(b)."); McGrew v. State, 673 N.E.2d
787, 800 (Ind. App. 1996) ("[T]he State
failed to present any evidence to satisfy
the first three prongs of Daubert.").
41 Cecil v. Commonwealth, 888

S.W.2d 669, 675 (Ky. 1994) (clinical
psychologist testimony on mens rea
properly admitted under Daubert).

Id. at 873.

42 Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641
N.E.2d 1342,1349 (Mass. 1994) ("We
accept the basic reasoning of the
Daubert opinion.").

State v. Donner, 531 N.W.2d 369
(Wis. App. 1995), rev. denied, 534
N.S.2d 86 (Wis. 1995).
37
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Mexico,43 Oklahoma,44 South Da

kota,45 Texas,46 and West Virginia.47
Even before Daubert, however,

courts in non-Frye jurisdictions had

adopted a type of "reliability" ap�

proach. For example, in

1984 the

Oregon Supreme Court rejected the

eluded truth-serum evidence on this
basis.50
Post-Daubert cases falling into

this category include: Arkansas,51
Delaware,52 Georgia,53 Iowa,54 Loui
siana,55 Montana,56 North Carolina,57

Frye test, but then went on to ex

clude polygraph evidence under the

elude that at present in our court sys
tem the probative value [of polygraph
evidence] is so outweighed by the rea
sons for its exclusion that the evidence
should not be admitted. . . ."); State v.
Thompson, 381 So. 2d 823, 824 (La.
1980) (rejecting voice stress analysis).

Oregon Rules of Evidence�48 Loui
siana applied a comparable analysis
in polygraph and voice stress analy
sis cases.49 Similarly, courts ex-

43 State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192
(N.M. 1993).
44 Taylor v. State, 889 P.2q 319, 328,
332 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) ("[T]he
·time is right for this court to abandon
the Frye test and adopt the more struc
tured artd yet flexible admissibility stan
dard set forth in Daubert.")..
45 State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482,
484 (SD. 1994) ("[G]eneral acceptance
in the scientific community is no longer
required.") (intoxilyzer).

46 E.l.Du P ont de Nemours & Co. v.
Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex.
1995) (commenting that Daubert prop"
erly strengthens the role of trial judge
as gatekeeper in civil cases).

. 50Harper v.State, 292 S.E .2d 389,
395-96 (Ga. 1982) (rejecting Ftye rule
but nevertheless excluding truth serum
evidence as unreliable).
51 Moore v. State, 915 S.W.2d 284,
294 (Ark. 1996) (DNA evidence no
longer novel; "Daubert . . . adopted a
reliability approach to Rule 702, com
parable to the relevancy approach of
Prater in which reliability is the criti
cal element.").
·

52 Nelson v. State; 628 A.2d 69, 73-

75 (Del. 1993) ("Our decisions [in prior
cases] are consistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert.").
53 Carr v. State, 482 S.E.2d 314 (Ga.
1997) (dog alert to fire accelerants riot
shown "with verifiable certainty" to be
accurate and reliable).

47 Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S,E.2d 196,
203-4 (W.Va. 1993) ("Daubert's analy
sis of Federal Rule 702 should be fol
lowed in analyzing the admissibiiity of
expert testirpony under 702 of West
Vrrginia Rules of Evidence."), cert. de
nied, 115 S. Ct. 1129 (1994).

54 Hutchison v. American Family
Mut. Ins. Co.,. 514 N.W.2d 882, 885
(Iowa 1994) (Daubert consistent with
Iowa precedents)..
. 55 State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116,
1123-27 (La. 1993) ("Past decisions of
this court have espoused similar senti
ments [as Daubert].").

48 State v. Brown,687 P.2d 751,775
(Or. 1984) (en bane) ("Notwithstanding
the usual deference to trial court dis
cretion, we as an appellate court retain
our role to determine the admissibility
of scientific evidence under the Oregon
Evidence Code.").

56 State v. Moore, 885 P.2!1 457, 471
(Mont. 1994). ("[T]he guidelines set
forth in Daubert are consistent with our
previous holding . . . concerning the
admission of experttestitnony of novel
scientific evidence, and we, therefore,
adopt the Daubert standard.").

49 State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975,
981 (La. 1979) ("[A]fter engaging in a
balancing process at the appellate Jevel
sirriilar to that recom mended b y
McCormick and other writers, we con-

57 State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631
(N.C. 1995) (bloodst a in pattern inter
pretation admissible under North Caro-
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other hand, e mphasized a more
flexible approach. . . . ).63

Oregon,58 Utah,59 Vermont,60 and

Wyoming.61 Consequently, Daubert

did not have much of an effect in
these jurisdictions, except to the ex

Frye "Plus" & Daubert

tent that it moved a state from the

"Plus"

less stringentrelevancy approach to

Before Daubertwas decided, sev

the reliability approach. In contrast,

enil courts had applied a Frye-plus

inState"lLkO_Sl!-]62 the litah:�\lPS.§In�

tesL64For example, in People v.

Court indicated th atits reliability ap

Castro,65 the court set forth a three

proach was more stringent than the

pronged analysis for the adm issibil

one required by Daubert. The Court

ity of scientific evide nce. The

wrote:

proponent must show that

If there is a noteworthy difference .
between the two opinions, it is per
haps that Ollr.opiqjgp !JJ BiiJJ_nu.i§ch
provides a detailed· and rigorous
outline for trial courts· to follow
when making .detei:minations con
cerning the adnlissibility of scien
tific evidence. . . . "[T]be triaicourt
should carefully explore each logi
cal link in the chain that leads to
expert testimony given in court and
determine its reliability. "} The Su
preme Court in Daubert, on the
·

( 1) the un

derlying theory has been generally
accepted, (2) the procedures imple

menting the thepry have been gen
erally accepted', and

(3) the testing

laboratory has followed these pro�
cedures. Because of the "complex

ity " of DNA anal y s i s and i t s
"powerful impact" o n a jury, the

court held that "passing muster un
der Frye alone is insufficient." Inthe

court's view, the prosecution satis
fied the first two prongs but not the

third. Daubert, Frye, and the rel
evancy apprpach all relate only to
the first two prongs.

Note, however, that this require

lina approach which is consistent with
Daubert).

ment predated the DN A cases. In a

58 State v. O'Key, 899 P 2d 663, 680
(Or. 1995) (en bane) ("Both l)aubert
and Brown allow Frye's 'general accep
tance' standard to be considered as one
factor in the trial court's decision about
adnussihility... . Faced with a proffer
of expert scientific testimony, an Or
egon trial court . . . should find Daubert
instructive"; HGN intoxication· test is
scientifically valid).

graphic ink analysis, the court

1971

,

stated: "It is widely recognized that

the party offering the results oflabo

rato cy tests must . . . vouch for its

correct administration in the particu

lar case."66 Moreover, this founda-

63 Id. at 6 4 2 (quoting State v.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 403 (Utah

59 State v. Cosby, 927 P. 2d 638,642
(Uta)j 1996).
·

.

1989)).

60 State v. Brooks, 643 A.2d 226 (Vt.

64 Goldberg, "A New Day for
DNA?," 78 A .B .A . J. 84,84 (Apr. 1992)
("Frye Plus").

1993) (Daubert consistent with Ver

mont precedents).

·

61 Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435,
442-43 (Wyo. 1993).
62

case involving chromato

65 People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d

985,987 (Sup. 1989).

66
United States v. Bruno, 333 F.
Supp. 570,574 (E. D. Pa. 1971).

State v. Cosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah

1996).
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.tional requirement is applied daily

in intoxication and radar.c
· ases.67

W hile the Alabama and Nebraska

Supreme Courts adopted the three

prong test,68 the federal courts split

. on the issue. In United States v. Two
Bulls, 69 the Eighth Circuit adopted

eva ted standa rd" as. "even mo
. re
·
stringentthan that in Frye ."70
The post Daubert developments
are difficultto categorize. Several
-

Frye jurisdictions have addressed
this issue. In People v. Wesley, 11 the
New YorkCourtof Appeals affirmed

the Castro approach. In contrast, the

Frye but held that case-specific er

rors generally go to the weight ofthe

Second Circuit, which had earlier

rejected Frye, also rejected this "el-

evidence; to its admissibility. As the

highest court in New York, Wesley

overrules Castro� In rejecting the

67. See 1 Giannelli & Imwinkelried,
Scientific Evidence 36 (2d ed. 1993)
(listing cases involving polygraph and
. voiceprint as well as. other types of
scientific e v idence that adopt this
position}.
68 See also Ex parte Perry, 586 So.
2d 242, 249-50 (Ala. 1991) (adopting
the thfee-pronged test) ("lJTthis particu
lar case, did the testing laboratory per
form generally accepted scientific
teChniq)leS without. error in the perfor
mance or interpretation of the tests?");
Ex parte Hutcherson, 677 So. 2d 1205,
1209 (Ala . 1996) ("[T]he testimony
from forensic scientist Elaine Scott
failed to satisfy the third prong of the
Perry test because she did not testify as
to the quality controls used by the Mo
bile laboratory [for DNA].Additionally,
testimony from Roger Morrison failed
to sufficiently meet the thj.rd prong, be
cause he explained only,one type of
quality control procedure used and did
not. testify as to other quality control
procedures used . . ..");State v. Houser,
490 N .W.2 d 168, 181 (Neb. 1992)
("[TJhe trial court, in de�ermining ad
missjbilityofDNA evidence, must first
be satisfied, and find, as to the general
acceptance of relevant DNAtheories in
the scientific community and must be
satisfied as to the acceptance and va
lidity of the methodology of testing
DNA used. The trial court then deter
mines if specific procedures were prop
erly followed in the case before the
·
court.").
69 United States v. Two Bulls, 918
F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990) (adqpting Castro
approach), vacated en brui'c, dismissed
as inoot after defendant's death, 925
F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991)..

three-pronged test, the Maryland
Court of Appeals adopted an inter
mediate approach: "Although these
particularized challenges ordinarily

will go to the weight of the evi

dence rather than its admissibility,
the trial judge retains discretion to

exclude evidence if it is sn unreli
able that it would not be helpful to
the factfinder;"72
Even after Daubert, the Eighth

Circuit in United States v. Martinez13

continued to impose this "plus" r�
quirement:
We believe t hat the reliability
inquiry set forth in Daubert man
dates that there be a pr elimin ary
showing that the expert properly
perform�d a reliabie methodology
in arriving at his 6pinion.... In
o rd er to d e te rmine whether scien
tific testimony is reliable, the court
must conclude that the·testimony
was derived from the application

70 United States v. Jalcobetz, 955 F.2d
786, 794--95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
. 506
u.s. 837 (1992).
71 People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451,
458 (N.Y. 1993).

·

72 Armstead v. State, 673 A.2d 221,
235 (Md. 1996).

73 United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d
1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1993).
·
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of a reliable methodology or prin

remarked: "[A]fter reviewing the

ciple in the particular case.

case law addressing this issue in the
context of other forensic laboratory

Thus, we conclude that the court

techniques and after careful consid

should make an initial inquiry into

eration of the testimony presented

the particular expert's application

at the hea.ring regarding the poly

of the scientific principle or meth

graph technique, the Court holds that

odolog)'in questiQp. ThJ::cgl]rt

in the context of polygraph evi

should require the testifying expert

dence, such scrutiny is imperative to

to provide affidavits attesting that

a faithful application of Daubert."77

he properly performed the proto�

Accordingly, the court went on to

cols involved in DNA profiling.74

rule "that in addition to establishing
the scientific validity of the poly

In United Stdtes v. Galbreth/5 a.

graph technique in the abstract, the

federal district court also discussed

proponent of the proposed testimony

the Daubert "plus" issue in a poly

must also p r ove that the specific

graph case: "It is not entirely clear

examination was conducted prop

whether Daubert requires as a pre

erly by a competent examiner."78

requisite to admissibility that the

Texas has also followed this ap

proponent establish the validity of

proach: "To be considered reliable,

lhe specific application of a scien

evidence of a scientific theory must

tific technique."76 The court further

satisfy the following three criteria:
(a) the underlying theory must b e
valid; (b) the technique applying the

. 74The Eighth Circuit later withdrew
the first opinion and substituted a new
opinion. The court's position on this is
sue, however, does not appear to have
changed. The court wrote:

theory must be valid; and (c) the tech
nique must have been properly applied
on the occasion in question."79 In ad
dition, Texas has required the propo
nent of novel scientific evidence to

We believe that the reliability in
quiry set forth in Daubert mandates
that there be a preliminary showing
that the expert properly performed a
reliable methodology in arri ving at
his opinion . . . . [Daubert] suggests
that the inquiry extends beyond sim
ply the reliability of the principles
or methodologies in the abstract. In
order to determine whether scientific
testimony is reliable, the court must
conclude that the testimony was de. rived from the application of a reli
able methodology or principle in the
particular case.

establish its reliability by clear and
convincing evidence.80

!iJaJuber['s "�e�om<ed" SiJ:allll[l]anr<Dl
A related issue concerns the ex

tent to which Daubert lowers the
barriers to admissibility. At the time

Daubert was decided in 1993, many

commentators i n t e r p r e t e d t h e
Court's opinion as replacing t h e
7 7 Id. a t 881.

United States v. Martinez, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 31026, *21-22 (8th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 734
(1994).

78 Id. at 882.
79 Campbell v. State, 910 S.W.2d
475, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en
bane) (citing Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d
568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).

75 United States v. Galbreth, 908 F.
Supp. 877 (D.N.M. 1995).

llO

76 Id. at 880--81.
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Frye general acceptance standard

observed that "the rationale under
lying this circuifs per se rule agamst
admitting polygraph evidence did
not survive Daubert."85 The court
went on to state:

Given the Rules' permissive back
drop and their inClusion of a spe
cific rule on expert testimony that
does. not mentio
, n "general accep
tance,'' the assertion that the Rules
SOI!lehow assimiiatei:l Frye is un
cmivincing. Frye made "general
acceptance" the exclusive test for
admitting expert sci entif ic testi
mon y. That ·aus ter e. stand:ud, ·ab. seritfrom and incompatible with
the Feoeral Rules of Evidence,
sho�ld. no( be appli�d 1n federal
tria ls. 81

[W)e do n ot now hold that poly
graph examinations are scientifi

with a more liberal stan9ard of ad
missibility. Passages in the opinion
support this view. For example, the
Court commented:

·

·

cally valid or that they will always
a s�ist the trier of fact. We merely
remove the obstacle of the per se
rule. against admissibility, which
was based on antiquated concepts
about the technical ability of the
polygraph and legal precepts [the
Frye rule] thathave been expressly
overruled by the.Supreme Cou ri 86
'

.

There is, however, an alternative
interpretation of Daubert. Admit
tedly, Daubert ovetruled F1ye and
adopted a different standard of ad
missibility-but not necessarily a
less stringent one. Daubert required
the trial judge to make an indepen
dent assessment of reliability. The
Court wrote:

·

Some later cases embraced this po
sltioi:t'.For example, in United States
v. Bmids,82 the Sixth Circuit ruled:
·"We find that the DNA testimony
easily meets the more liberal test set
out :b:y the' Supreme Court in
Daitbert."83 Sirmlady; the Second
Circuithas written: "[B]y loosening
the strictures on scientific evi
dence set by Frye, Diiube'rt reinforces the idea that there should be
a presumption of admissibility."84
The polygraph cases illustrate this
development. The Fifth Circuit has

[l]n order to qualify as "scientific
knowledge," an inference or asser
tion must be derived by the scien
tific method. Proposed testimony
must be supported by appropriate
validation-i.e., "good grounds,"
based on what is known. In short,
the requirement that an expert's
testi mony per tain to "scientific
knowledge" establishes a standard
of evidentiary reliability_B?

81 509 U.S. at 589.

82 United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d
540 (6th Cir. 1993).
83 Id. at 568. See also United States
v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663,668-69 (2d Cir.
1995) ("The Federal Rules. of Evidence,
although concededly more liberal than
the Frye test, still require a determina
tion that the proffered �cientific evi
dence is both relevant and reliable.").

In addition, the trial court's admis
sibility determination· "entails a
preliminary assessment of whether
85 United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d
428, 429 (5th Cir. 1995).
86 Id. at 434.

84 Bora wick v. Shay, 68 F. 3d 597,
610 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 1869 (1996).

87
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the reasoning or methodology un
derlying the testimony is scientifi
cally valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly
can be applied to the facts in issue."33
General Electric Co. v. Joiner,39
the United States Supreme Court's
only decision interpreting Daubert,
provides some ·tunhet�elabt>tation.
Joiner alleged that exposure to PCBs

had caused his cancer, but the trial
court had excluded the plaintiff's
expert testimony on causation as un
supported speculation. The Supreme
Court was asked to determine the
standard of appellate review. The
Court adopted an abuse-of-discre
tion standard for reviewing a trial
court's admissibility decision under
Daubert. In one passage, the Court
wrote: "[W]hile the Federal Rules
of Evidence allow district courts to
admit a somewhat broader range of
scientific testimony tha..11 would have
been admissible under Frye, they
leave in place the 'gatekeeper' role
of the trial judge in screening such
evidence."90 Again, the ambiguity of
Daubert is repeated; a "broader
range" of testimony is admissible,
but the trial court's gatelceeping
function is also emphasized. More
over, the trial court in Joiner had
excluded the plaintiff's expert testi
mony, i.e., applying a rather de
manding admissibility standard.
In addition, the Supreme Court
elaborated on a sentence in Daubert
that had proved troublesome. In
Daubert the Court had written that
the "focus, or course, must be solely
on principles and methodology, not

district court had ened because it
had disagreed with the conclusions
(not the methods) that the experts
had drawn from the scientific stud

ies. The Court responded to this ar
gument by noting that:

[C]onclusions and methodology

are not entirely distinct from one

another. Trained experts s;ommonly

extrapolate from existing data. But

nothing in either Daubert or the

Federal Rules of Evidence requires

·

of the expert.'A court may conclude

that there is simply too great an

analytical gap between the data and

the opinion proffered.92

Here, again, the district court had not
applied a lax standard; it had scruti

nized the underlying scientific ba
sis (i.e., animal and epidemiological

studies) of the experts' opinions. As
the Supreme Court noted, the ani
mal studies were "dissimilar" to the
facts presented in this litigation and
the epidemiological studies "were

not a sufficient basis for the experts'

opinions."93ln sum, Joiner does not
seem to resolve the "relaxed" stan
dard issue.
The view that Daubert does not

adopt a lax standard finds support
in recent cases dealing with ques

tioned document and hair compari

sons.

Q\Uies�ioll1lte<dl Do�t:lUimtell1l�S
In United States v. Starzecpyzel94

on the conclusions that they gener

a federal district court concluded

ate."91 The plaintiff argued that the
88

a district court to admit opinion
evidence which is connected to
existing data only by the ipse dixit

Id. at 592-93.

89 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118

92 loiner, 118S. Ct. at 519.

S. Ct. 512 (1997).

93 Id. at 518.

90Id. at 517.

94 UnitedStates v.Starzecpyzel, 880
F.Supp. 1027, 1038(S.D. N.Y. 1995).

91 Daubert, 509 U.S . at 595.
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that "the testimony at the Daubert
hearing frrinly established that fo
rensic document exarriination, de
spite the existence of a certification
program, professional journals and
other trappings of science, cannot,
after Daubert, be regarded as 'sci
entific .,.. Icpowledge."' In addition,
"while scientific principles may re
late to_aspec�s ofhanciwriting analy
sis, they haye little or nothing to do
with the day-to-daytasks performed
by [Forensic Document Examiners]
. . . [T]his attenuated relationship
does not transform the FDE into a
scientist."95 - .. The court ruled that Daubert ap
plied only to expert testimony that
is "scientific " within the meaning of
Federal Rule 702. But Rule 702 also
permits the'adnrission ofexpert tes
timony based on "technical " or
"other sp�cialized knowledge, " and
in the court's view, Daubert did not
apply to nonsCientific eJ(perts fall
ing within tb_ese categories. The
court went on to hold, �owever, that
the Rule 702 requirements limiting
expert testimony to that which as�
sists the trier of fact and is proffered
by. a qualified expert must neverthe
less be satisfied: "[T]his court con
cludes that adequate guidance can
be found withi n Rule 702 to conduct
a meaningful inquiry into the reli
ability of the expertise claimed by
FDEs."9 6 Mter the court found the
testimony to be sufficiently reliable,
it considered the risk of unfair preju
dice. Because of FDE's use of terms
such as "laboratory " and references
to authorities with titles that may
contain the words "science "or "sci
entific, " there was a risk that jurors
95

Id. at 1041.

96

Id. at 1043.
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may bestow upon FDE's the aura
of the infallibility- of scientists.
Moreover, use of anine-level scale
ofprobability to express aii opin�
ion regarding genuineness ap
peared, in the court's view, to be
nrisleadingly precise. Such overly
fine distinctions are inappropriate in
forensic document examination
where it is conceded that conclu
sions are drawn, in large part, on
subjective criteria.97
These problems do not preclude
admission because several proce
dures can attenuate these risks. The
first is ajury instruction stating that
"FDEs offer practiCal rather than
scientific -expertise.'' 9 8 Second, the
court may restrict testimony relat
ing to the existence ofthe nine�level
scale. Finally, the defense is entitled
''to attack the reliability of forensic
document examination, ...to attack
the expertise of each testifying FDE,
[and] to introduce the testimony of
their own,FDE. "99
Later cases affJIIiled this :view. In
United States v. Velasquez, 100 the
Third Circuit ruled tl1atthe trial court
"erred as a matter of. law in denying
the. defense the opportunity to criti:cize the standards employed in that
field of expertise. "The expert would
·

97 Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1049. The court attached a
draft jury instruction to the end of the
opinion. Id. at 1050-5L
98

·

99 Id. at 1050.
100

United States v. Vt<lasquez, 64
F.3d 844, 848 (3d Cir, 1995). See also
United States v. Ruth, 42 ML730, 732
(Army Ct. App. 1995) (expert handwrit
ing testimony admissible under Rule
702 as "technical, and other specialized
knowledge" even if it does not satisfy
Daubert) (appointment of defense ex�
pert denied) aff'd, 46 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F.
'
1997).
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cepted in the community of hair ex
perts, the human hair comparison
results in this case were, non�the
less, scientifically unreliable."ro5 Fi
nally, the prosecutor exacerbated the
problem by stating in the closing
argument, "[T]here's a match. " The
state_courtals.o)nisint�rpreted the
evidence, . wrl.ting that the "hair
evidence placed [Petitioner] <:!-t .the
d e c edent ' ' s apartn)ent." Th�
"prosecutor's-mischaracterization
of the hair evidence misled. the
1 6
jury...."0
The Tenth Cll:cuit reversed on the
ground thatdue'process, not Daubert,
1 7
was the standard in habeas cases.0
Subsequently, an·Indiana appel
late court wrote: ".[l]he State mis
takenly believed that a Daubert
foundation·was only required for
novel scientific techniques, and thus
did not attempt io· hty the requisite
foundation of evidentiary reliability
1 8
[for hair comparison evidence]. "0

have testified that "handwriting
analysis is not a valid field qf scien
tific expertise becauseithtcks stan
dards to guide experts in weighing
the match or non-match of particu
lar handwriting characteristics. "101
1 2 the Sixth
In United States v. Jones,0
Gircuit"·wrote"'��!In�shoft,.,-HJl_ett

handwriting analysis is a field of
expertise under the Feder�Rules of
Evidence. This decision, however,
does not guarantee the reliability or
admissibility of this type of testi
mony in a particular case."

·Hair- ComparisonsIn Williamson v. R�ynolds,103 a
federal habeas,corpus cll,Se, _an ex
pert testified that hair samples were
"microscopically consistent.'; How
ever, the "expert did not explain
which of the 'approximately' 25
characteristics were consistent, any
standards for determinmg \Vhether
the samples were consistent, how
many persons .could be e)(pected to
share this same. c;ombination of char
acteristics, or lmw he arrived at his
conclusions." Moreover, �1t]his
court has been unsuccessful in its
attempts to locate any indication that
expert hair comparison. testimony
meets any of. the requirements of
1
Daubert." 04 The court further ob
served: "Although the hair expert
may' have followed procedures ac-

Conclusion
In sum, it is too_ ecrrl y to predict
the long-r�ge impact of Pt!-ubert.
As Daubert moves into its fifth year,
the courts are still struggling to de
fine its scope. Moreover, the state
courts are in the process of deciding
whether the Daubert standard
should replace Frye.
105 Id. at 1558.
10 6 Id. at 1557. But see McCarty

101 64 F.3d at 846.
102 United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d
.

1147, 1160 (6th Cir. 1997).
103 Williamson

v.

State, 904 P.2d 110, 125 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1995).

107 Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d
1508, (lOth Cir. 1997).

Reynolds, 904 F.
Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
v.

108 McGrew v. State, 673 N.E.2d 787,
802 (Ind. App. 1996).

104 Id. at 1557.
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